Convention on Nuclear Safety

Report by the Government of Republic Indonesia for the Seventh Review Meeting in April 2017

Contents

A. INTRODUCTION

After signing the Convention in 1994, Indonesia then promulgated Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy, which lays a strong foundation of national policy for nuclear safety in accordance with the Convention, including the creation of an independent regulatory body (BAPETEN). At the same time, the Act also adapts Vienna Convention on Nuclear Damage and provides penal provision. Indonesia consistently demonstrates its commitment to this Convention after ratifying the Convention in 2002.

The Act requires the Applicants and the Licensees of nuclear facility to demonstrate the safety throughout the lifetime of the source. More detail safety requirements were laid down in some Government Regulations (GRs) under the Act, and followed by BAPETEN Chairman Regulations (BCRs) for technical matters. Furthermore, inspection and enforcement is an integrated part of the regulatory system in Indonesia, together with emergency preparedness arrangement, waste management, and management system requirements. Country reports submitted by Indonesia under the Convention highlight the national policy towards nuclear safety. Other national policies, such as stakeholder involvement, and transparency and openness in governmental decision making, are clearly support nuclear safety in Indonesia.

Besides addressing safety, the Act also make it possible for the Country to develop nuclear programme for peaceful uses. Currently, the Government promotes development of a small power research reactor, and the site for this reactor is in the licensing process. Government promoting organization (BATAN), separated from BAPETEN, will be the operator of this Nuclear Installation. In addressing national energy demand, the central Government is also considering to develop commercial power reactor, either medium or large scale.

Construction and operation of NPP in Indonesia are based on the Energy Policy which are stipulated in:

1. Act Number 17 year 2007 on Long-Term National Development Planning year 2005-2025.
2. GR Number 14 year 2015 on Master Plan of National Industrial Development year 2015-2035.
3. Presidential Regulation Number 1 year 2014 on Guide of National Energy Plan Establishment.
4. GR Number 79 year 2014 on National Energy Policy.
5. Presidential Regulation Number 2 year 2015 on Mid-Term National Development Planning year 2015-2019

Concerning to construction and operation of NPP, Government established National Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee that has responsibility to provide consideration and recommendation related to nuclear energy utilization. The establishment of National Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee is stipulated in Presidential Regulation Number 83 year 2014.

The licensing process is technically carried out in accordance to GRs & BCRs, that adopting the IAEA Standards mostly, and international best practice in few cases. In order to ensure our preparation, Indonesia invited IAEA for the IRRS Mission in 2015 and a workshop to follow up the mission in 2016, and pre-SEED Mission in 2015 and SEED Mission in 2016.

Regarding to the Lesson-Learned of Fukushima accident, Indonesia has highly committed to the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in February 9, 2015, in the implementation of the objective of the Convention on Nuclear Safety to prevent accidents and mitigate radiological consequences.

With the above explanation on national nuclear safety regime and national plan on nuclear energy development, it can be seen that Indonesia puts its highest commitment to the Convention, both for the current nuclear facilities and for the future Nuclear Installation—as defined by this Convention.

This national report is prepared in accordance to INFCIRC 572 Rev. 5 (2015). The current status of the safety of three research reactors (non-power reactor) operated in Indonesia were reported. New features, regulation and policies related to safety are also part of this report.

B. SUMMARY REPORT

This report is prepared not only to fulfill obligation of Indonesia as the party of this Convention and as the supporter of Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS). This is also a self-assessment results, and as an embarking country this is a demonstration of commitment to nuclear safety. Through the submission and presentation of this report, Indonesia is open for any recommendation and suggestion that might arise during the review meeting.

For the existing three research reactors there is no significant safety issue found in the last three years. However, Indonesia is fully aware that the three facilities are more than 20 years of old. Hence ageing management, preparing the report of periodic safety review, developing a better decommissioning programme, and enhancing safety culture are among the top priorities in Indonesia.

The current safety challenge in Indonesia is regarding the application of site license, located in Serpong, by the promoting organization (BATAN) for the proposed power research reactor. To face this, both side, BATAN and the regulator (BAPETEN), utilized national best scientists and engineers from national universities, research institutes, government agencies and private and state-own companies to be as their service provider and TSO. Indonesia is also request Pre-SEED and SEED Mission through the IAEA TC Project. From the Pre-SEED Mission done in 2015, it can be considered that regulatory documentation and national experts are sufficiently available in Indonesia. The full SEED Mission itself will be implemented by the end of 2016. This cooperation is aimed to review national performance on siting.

For the next three years, Indonesia will have to deal with safety issue in siting, design approval, and manufacturing of for the proposed power research reactor. Indonesia already develop international and bilateral cooperation to enhance its capability for this. Some activities in this cooperation are in progress, such as national training courses, and scientific visits to advanced countries and potential countries of origin. Furthermore, if the Government later on decides to build Nuclear Installation (commercial power plant), then siting is also a safety priority. In this case, the last two years and the upcoming experience dealing with site licensing process should make Indonesia more confident in managing this challenge.

As an embarking country, Indonesia needs to learn more on the implementation of VDNS, as one of the topics identified and agreed upon at the Organizational Meeting. The method to evaluate the fulfillment of this Declaration should be a challenge. Anyway, Indonesia strongly support the idea and spirit of VDNS as a proper world endeavor together to prevent such nuclear disaster from happen again in the future.

In the last review meeting, Indonesia received no recommendation and suggestion, and identified to have two good practices. Our target for this report is to maintain the fulfillment of the Convention and of the VDNS, and to demonstrate our commitment and measures in improving our safety performance and safety culture. But again, Indonesia welcomes any honest discussion to enhance our safety performance and safety culture.

Since the Government proposed to build a small power research reactor, then Indonesia needs to enhance its safety infrastructures in accordance with this Convention. For this, Indonesia has plan to continue building its competency and gaining sufficient resources, especially for the sufficiency and quality of human resources in both operator, regulator, service provider and TSO sides. One very important modality is that since 1997 Indonesia has an independent regulatory body, where the Chairman appointed and report directly by the President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Indonesia received a full scope IAEA IRRS Mission in August 2015. As part of commitment in transparency, the result of this mission is made public in the IAEA website. From the executive summary of the IRRS Mission report, it can quoted here that: "Based on the IRRS evaluation against the IAEA safety standards, the IRRS Team concluded that Indonesia, through the BAPETEN, is implementing a framework that provides for protection of public health and safety. The IRRS Team also identified areas where further improvement can be achieved by implementing an appropriate action plan." Then, in July 2016 BAPETEN cooperate with IAEA organizing National Workshop on IRRS Results and Action Plans. This is part of commitment and strategy to implement recommendations and suggestions from the mission in effective and efficient ways. From time to time Indonesia will evaluate the progress, and there will be a time expected in the near future to perform self-assessment before requesting the IAEA for the follow-up IRRS Mission.

Very soon after Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 2011, Indonesia performed a kind of stress test to all of its research reactors. Instruction to perform corrective and preventive measures to one reactor has been given by the regulatory body and been implemented fully by the operator. Based on this experience, Indonesia shared its experience with the participation in the preparation of the IAEA Safety Report Series No. 80 document, entitled "Safety reassessment for research reactors in the light of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant", published in March 2014.

Some important emergency exercises was organized in the last three years. These are table-top and follow-up by field exercise with scenario of severe accident at MPR-30 GA Siwabessy in Serpong in 2015; and a field exercise of illicit trafficking involving radioactive materials as a joint exercise between BAPETEN and Indonesian Coast Guard held in Batam island in 2016. Some lesson learned from the above exercises are it is realized the need to improve the coordination among stakeholders during an emergency response, and the capabilities of the most responders still need to be upgraded.

Last but not least, Indonesia enacted Act No. 14 Year 2008 on the Transparency of Public Information and Act No. 30 Year 2014 on the Government Administration. These Acts answering the need for transparency and openness in regulation the utilization of nuclear energy, which are considered as essential if the Government commit to build Nuclear Installation in Indonesia. As part of transparency strategy, BAPETEN publish all of its regulation and activities in its website, including its service standard of public information management. On openness issue, BAPETEN held many public hearing events in many provinces highly utilizing nuclear energy or potentially be the site of the future Nuclear Installation, and open for public comments or enquiries through its website to any draft of regulation and licensing plan and decision. As a government institution, BATAN in operation side also implements these national policy on transparency and openness.

C. ARTICLE BY ARTICLE REVIEW

Article 6. EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this Convention, the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact.

Existing nuclear installations

As it was reported previously, Indonesia at this moment is not operating any Nuclear Installation, as defined in this Convention. However, there are three research reactors operated in the Country as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Research Reactors in Indonesia

(1) MPR GA Siwabessy.

The MPR GA Siwabessy is a pool-type reactor, cooled and moderated by light water with forced convection. The reactor is located in the area for Development of Science and Technology (Puspiptek), Serpong, 40 km south west of Jakarta. The reactor, with 30 MWt nominal power, has been operated by BATAN since 1987 for the purpose of material testing and analysis, radioisotope production, research, as well as education and training activities. The operation license of the reactor is valid until December 2020.

(2) TRIGA 2000 Reactor.

The TRIGA 2000, located in Bandung, West Java, is a pool (TRIGA MARK II) type reactor using H_2O both as the moderator and coolant with licensed power at 1 MW. The first criticality of the reactor was achieved in 1965, and currently is operated by BATAN for the purpose of material analysis, radioisotope production, research etc. The operation license of the reactor is valid until December 2016.

(3) Kartini Reactor.

Kartini Reactor, located in Yogyakarta, is also a pool (TRIGA MARK II) type reactor with licensed power at 100 KW. The first criticality of the reactor was achieved in 1979. This reactor is operated by BATAN for the purpose of material analysis, research, education, training, etc. This reactor has the operation license valid until December 2019.

Table A.1 shows Data of Nuclear Installation.

Safety related issues

1. MPR GA Siwabessy

There are 8 control elements containing the absorber Ag-In-Cd in the core. This absorber is produced by Industri Nuklir Indonesia Co. (PT. INUKI), a state-owned company. In this case, 6 control elements has been approved by BAPETEN, while the remaining 2 control elements are under evaluation to obtain approval for usage. Furthermore, the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) report of this reactor is being carried out since September 2013. The report will be submitted by the end of 2016.

2. TRIGA 2000 Reactor

Following the temporary shutdown that has been reported previously, BATAN decided to continue the operation of the reactor with the remaining TRIGA fuel elements and modified control rods. In this instance, two out of five operating control rods were designed without fuel follower. These control rods without fuel follower were produced by BATAN. In 2015, BAPETEN has issued modification approval for the utilization of control rods without fuel follower. Then, BATAN performed and demonstrated functional tests of these control rods. The results were evaluated by

BAPETEN, and was stated as meet all the safety requirements. Previously, BATAN has also performed retrofitting of the reactor building. Currently, BATAN is preparing the application of operation licence renewal for this reactor.

3. Kartini Reactor

Based on BAPETEN safety inspection and evaluation, this reactor fulfils all safety requirements and is expected to operate safely until the end of its operation license in 2019. In order to obtain operation license renewal, BATAN is preparing PSR, and the report will be submitted by the end of 2016.

Programmes and measures for the safety

Indonesia commits to further enhance safety culture applied both in the operator and regulator side. This would complete the existing programmes in maintaining and where possible improving nuclear safety in Indonesia. The operator continues developing their periodic safety review and ageing management, while at the same time also preparing their decommissioning programme as required by law. Regulator endures its task to ensure safety through licensing review, inspection, and regulation development. In order to assure sustainability in safety, both sides commit to further enhance knowledge management, and implement a better strategy on transparency and openness.

Statement of the operation of nuclear installation

Indonesia decides to continue the safe operation of the three research reactors until further decision regarding the ageing management, fuel availability, and the utilization of the plants. Moreover, Indonesia is in the final phase to resolve the development of an experimental power reactor.

Article 7. Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations.

2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:

i. the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations

ii. a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of the operation of a nuclear installation without a license;

iii. a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licenses;

iv. the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licenses, including suspension, modification or revocation

Article 7 (1) Establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework

Primary legislative framework

The hierarchy of national legislation system in Indonesia is described in the following picture:



Figure 2. The hierarchy of national legislation system in Indonesia

On the framework for nuclear safety, Indonesia established Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy, together with some ratification of safety related international conventions listed in the next paragraph. As the interface with national legislation, the establishment process of law and regulation is based on national regulation, i.e. Act No. 12 Year 2011 on the Establishment of Laws. In addition, the position, task, function and authority of non-ministerial government institution, such as BAPETEN and BATAN, is regulated by GR No. 103 Year 2001. National legislation also addresses financial system of government institution, stakeholder involvement in governmental decision making, transparency and openness, industrial safety and health, environmental safety, and other administrative arrangements.

The implementing instruments of the above laws are listed in the Table A.2. List of Regulation for Nuclear Installation. Enacted regulations after 2013 are:

- GR No 61 Year 2013 on the Radioactive Waste Management;
- GR No 2 Year 2014 on the Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials; and
- GR No. 58 Year 2015 on the Radiation Safety and the Transport Security of Radioactive Materials.

Ratification of international conventions and legal instruments

Indonesia is also party to major international conventions related to nuclear safety. These include:

- Convention on Nuclear Safety, ratified with Presidential Regulation (PR) No. 106 Year 2001;
- Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, ratified with PR No. 81 Year 1993;
- Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, ratified with PR No. 82 Year 1993; and
- Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, ratified with PR No. 84 Year 2010;

In addition, Indonesia is committed to implement the provisions of the IAEA Codes of Conduct on Safety of Research Reactors.

Article 7 (2) (i) National safety requirements and regulations

Secondary legislation

In Indonesia, BAPETEN is responsible to issue secondary legislation for nuclear safety including technical regulations and guides. BAPETEN Chairman Regulation (BCR) is issued to provide further detail technical requirements on safety in implementing a specific Government Regulation. BAPETEN has established BCRs for siting, design, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear installations adopting and/or adapting relevant IAEA standards. The list of BCR is attached in Table A.2.

Regulations and guides issued

For the reporting period of 2013 to date, there have been some BCRs enacted related to the safety of nuclear reactor. They are:

- BCR No. 4 Year 2013 on the Radiation Protection and Safety in Nuclear Energy Utilization;
- BCR No. 6 Year 2013 on Working Permit for Nuclear Installation and Material Personnel;
- BCR No. 7 Year 2013 on the Environmental Radioactivity Limit;

- BCR No. 8 Year 2013 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspect of Seismology, amending BCR No. 1 Year 2008 on the NPP Site Evaluation in the Aspect of Seismology;
- BCR No. 9 Year 2013 on the Limiting and Condition for Operation (LCO) for Non Power Reactor
- BCR No. 2 Year 2014 on Core Management and Fuel Handling and Storage for NPP;
- BCR No. 3 Year 2014 on the Format and Content of Environmental Impact Analysis for Nuclear Installation;
- BCR No. 6 Year 2014 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspects of Meteorology and Hydrology, amending BCR No. 5 Year 2008 on the NPP Site Evaluation in the Aspects of Meteorology;
- BCR No. 1 Year 2015 on the Emergency Response Management of BAPETEN;
- BCR No. 2 Year 2015 on the Verification and Safety Assessment of Non Power Reactor; and
- BCR No. 5 Year 2015 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspect of Volcanology, amending BCR No. 2 Year 2008 on the NPP Site Evaluation in the Aspect of Volcanology.

Process of establishing and revising regulatory requirements

BAPETEN has issued a law making procedure for establishing and revising BCR, adopting Act No. 12 Year 2011 on the Establishment of Laws. The procedure includes a process for obtaining comments from interested parties, including receiving public comment through the website. The BCRs is required to be published in the Official Gazette as the final process of the enactment. Then BAPETEN disseminates the new issued BCRs to the stakeholders.

Article 7 (2) (ii) System of licensing

Licensing system and processes

The licensing system of nuclear installation follows the provisions and requirements stated by the GR No. 2 Year 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials. This government regulation regulates licensing procedures, licensing requirement documents, and the time frame of licensing process.

Licensing for nuclear installations is conducted in multi-step licensing processes, from siting, design approval, construction, commissioning, operation, to decommissioning. Licensing requirements in each step are categorized into administrative, technical, and financial requirements. Administrative requirements are, inter alia, related to legal ownership of operating company and other license that has to be obtained from other related licensing institution(s). Technical requirements are required by BAPETEN to ensure the safety of nuclear installations, and the detailed provision regarding technical document is stipulated on BCR. Financial requirements are financial assurance for construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning, as well as the liability for nuclear

damage during commissioning and operation. The financial requirements are only applied to commercial nuclear installations.

BAPETEN performs review and assessment of the submitted licensing application documents to ensure that all requirements are fulfilled. During this review and assessment process, BAPETEN performs inspection to verify the conformity of safety requirements. Figure 3 depicts the verification activity by BAPETEN.



Figure 3. Verification document and witnessing activity by BAPETEN

Involvement of the public and interested parties

Involvement of the public and interested parties in licensing process is stipulated in Act No. 30 of 2014 on The Government Administration. This Act requires the government institution to provide opportunity for public hearing in the decision making process, including in license or approval issuance/revocation/suspension/modification. Figure 4 describes public hearing organized by BAPETEN on the site licensing process of Experimental Power Reactor proposed by BATAN.

Figure 4. Public hearing on the site licensing process

Preventing the operation of a nuclear installation without a valid license

To prevent the operation of a nuclear installation without a valid license, Act No. 10 of 1997 on Nuclear Energy provides penal provision with fine or imprisonment. Furthermore, for the existing facilities, BAPETEN may send notification to remind the licensees on their licensing status that would be expired in the near future. For new built installation, such prevention could also be carried out through coordination with related government institutions dealing with import-export control.

Article 7 (2) (iii) System of regulatory inspection and assessment

Regulatory strategies

Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy states that BAPETEN shall perform inspection to nuclear installations to ensure the compliance to nuclear safety regulations and licensing conditions. The strategies to implement the inspection policy are:

1. BAPETEN develops inspection program to carry out regular and unannounced inspection activities as mandated by the Act.

2. To carry out the tasks, inspectors are provided with sufficient authorities as stipulated in GR No. 2 Year 2014 on the Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials. In order to ensure their competences to perform inspection, BAPETEN develops inspector training and qualification program. To maintain the inspector competence, BAPETEN conducts refreshment training course, and organize inspection experience sharing forum which is held twice a year.

3. BAPETEN coordinates with related institutions for law enforcement to follow up inspection findings where necessary.

4. BAPETEN provides sufficient infrastructure to support safety inspection program, such as:

    - a real time and online monitoring system for the reactor operating parameters and environmental radiation level;
    - an online radioactive waste inventory reporting system;
    - a worker doses evaluation reporting system
    - environmental laboratory;
    - inspection procedures and working instructions; and
    - Inspection tools and equipment

    Where necessary, BAPETEN may request assistance from external independent laboratories and/or experts.

Regulatory inspection and assessment process

Regulatory inspection is managed in accordance with the Management System of BAPETEN (SMB). Planning of inspection is conducted each year by determining the number of inspections, inspection personnel, objects and scopes, and schedules. The scopes of nuclear safety inspection are operation, radiation protection, maintenance and ageing management, emergency preparedness, and management system. Basic techniques used by the inspectors include verification by confirmatory measurements, auditing, and data review. For preparation for the inspection, the inspection team conducts an internal meeting to detail the inspection scope, and discuss the previous inspection report, time allocations, distribution of inspection tasks, and the need of inspection tools.

Basic features of inspection programmes

Inspection program is developed based on risk assessment of the facilities. For higher risk facility, BAPETEN performs more frequent, comprehensive, and thorough inspections. The inspection is conducted through documentation audit and field verification, including interview, in-situ measurement, and sampling for laboratory testing where necessary. BAPETEN provide written guidance including inspection procedures, working instruction and the checklists. These documents are periodically reviewed and updated. During the inspection, inspectors are required to be accompanied by the technical staffs of the facility to confirm any potential findings. The inspection findings are presented to the facility top management in the exit meeting. The facilities are required to develop and implement action plan related to the findings, and this plan is a subject for approval by BAPETEN. Figure 5 shows the inspection activity by BAPETEN.

Figure 5. BAPETEN routine inspection activity

Article 7 (2) (iv) Enforcement of applicable regulations and terms of licenses

Power for legal actions

The legal basis for enforcement is stipulated in the Act 10 Year 1997, GR No. 54 Year 2012, GR No. 61 Year 2013 and GR No. 2 Year 2014. These law and regulations provide power to BAPETEN to take or to initiate necessary legal enforcement actions.

Enforcement measures

Enforcement actions shall be applied in accordance with safety condition of the facility. These actions could be in the form of written warning, license suspension, ultimately revocation of license, or penal provision. In the case of penal prosecution, BAPETEN has to follow national civil law.

Experience with legal actions and enforcement measures.

The most common enforcement measure taken by BAPETEN was written warning. Facilities have to follow up this written warning, and submit the progress report to BAPETEN. Inspector then performs inspection to verify the follow up action.

Article 8 An Independent Regulatory Body

1. *Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.*
2. *Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.*

Article 8 (1) Establishment of the regulatory body

Legal foundations and statute of the regulatory body

The Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy separates regulatory and executive function. In implementing this policy, then, Presidential Decree No 76 of 1998 on Nuclear Energy Regulatory Authority establishes BAPETEN as an independent governmental organization for the regulatory control in the use of nuclear energy. Its responsibilities are clearly set out in the Act and its implementing regulations. It is important to underline that according to the Act, the Chairman of BAPETEN is responsible and report directly to the President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Mandate, mission and tasks

The mandate of BAPETEN to regulate the utilization of nuclear energy in Indonesia is also fostered by the Presidential Decree No. 103 Year 2001 on the Status, Main Task, Function, Authority, Organizational Structure, and Working Orders of Non Department Government Institutions, as amended by Presidential Decree Number 9 Year 2004.

The mission of BAPETEN, in accordance to Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy, are to:

1. assure the welfare, the security and the peace of people;
2. assure the safety and the health of workers and public, and the protection to the environment;
3. maintain legal order in implementing the use of nuclear energy;
4. enhance legal awareness of operator to foster nuclear safety culture;
5. prevent the diversion of the peaceful uses of nuclear material; and
6. assure the maintenance and improvement of the worker discipline in carrying out nuclear energy utilization.

The Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy provides BAPETEN with the main tasks to develop regulation, conduct licensing process, and perform inspection. In order to implement its tasks, the above Presidential Decree No. 103 Year 2001 grants BAPETEN with the function to:

1. perform assessment and develop national policy in the field of nuclear regulation;
2. coordinate functional activities in implementing the tasks;
3. facilitate and provide guidance for government activities in the field of nuclear regulation; and,
4. organize supervision and service on public administration in the field of general planning, management, organization and management system, staffing, finance, archive, legal affair, encryption, and accommodation and housekeeping.

Authorities and responsibilities

To carry out its functions, Presidential Decree No. 103 Year 2001 provides BAPETEN with the authorities and responsibilities to:

1. develop national plan in nuclear regulation;
2. formulate national policy in nuclear regulation to support national development;
3. establish accreditation and certification in nuclear regulation;
4. other relevant authorities and responsibilities: develop and implement regulatory policy; establish regulatory management system; assure the welfare, the security and the peace of people in nuclear energy utilization; assure the safety and the health of workers and public, and the protection to the environment from the harmful effects of radiation; and prevent the diversion of the peaceful uses of nuclear material.

Organizational structure of the regulatory body

The organizational structure of BAPETEN is outlined in Figure 6 below. BAPETEN is led by a Chairman, who is appointed by and report directly to the President of the Republic of Indonesia. The operational ‘core’ activities are carried out under the leaderships of the Deputy Chairman for Nuclear Safety Assessment and the Deputy Chairman for Licensing and Inspection. The two Deputy Chairmen as well as the Executive Secretary are appointed by the President.



Figure 6. The organizational structure of BAPETEN

Development and maintenance of human resources over the past three years

BAPETEN recruits technical staff based on workload analysis, prediction of personnel needs for the existing and the planned or near future activities, including the regulatory supervision for the potential NPP programme.

To further enhance the capabilities of staff in various specialized fields, BAPETEN cooperates with the IAEA through national TC Projects. In addition, Indonesia has bilateral agreements with major NPP operating countries (such as the US, Canada, Japan and ROK), and the EU for capacity building programme in regulating NPP and the existing nuclear facilities and activities. The cooperation includes tailored on the job training or tutoring, training courses, workshops, train the trainers, and scientific visits. In addition, BAPETEN dispatches many employees to domestic and foreign universities for advance education.

Regarding human resources issue, BAPETEN develops human resources development (HRD) plan and apply the IAEA model “Systematic Assessment of Regulatory Competence Needs for Regulatory Bodies of Nuclear Facilities” (SARCoN). Previously, BAPETEN has performed Training Need Assessment for technical staff. With the IAEA, BAPETEN organize a workshop on SARCoN; and with the USNRC, BAPETEN arrange a workshop on evaluating the competency requirements and the adequacy of evaluator for site licensing application.

Statement of adequacy of resources

Regarding the adequacy of resources of BAPETEN, Act No. 17 Year 2003 on the State Finance, Act No. 14 Year 2015 on the State Budgeting, and Act No. 5 Year 2014 on the State Civil Apparatus stated the Government financially guarantee BAPETEN to perform its tasks and functions with sufficient number of management and employees. Additionally, Presidential Decree No. 76 Year 1998 on Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency, stipulates that the entire budget needed is billed to the Government budget. The financial resources of BAPETEN are based on the national annual budget plan which is approved by Ministry of National Development Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the Parliament. Aside from the government funding, financial resources of BAPETEN come from licensing fees as stipulated in the Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy. The amount of these licensing fees is stipulated by the Government Regulation 56 Year 2014 on Non-Tax Revenues Applicable for BAPETEN.

In implementing the HRD plan, BAPETEN develops training programme for their employee, including advance degree and various types of training activities. The number of needed employees is also evaluated, and projection has been made, especially in anticipating the introduction of NPP technology to the Country. For the current situation, the number of current employees is considered to be sufficient with continuing training activities needed. However, additional staff is significantly needed in the near future. In this case, BAPETEN has coordinated with national institution dealing with civil servant and the administration.

Currently BAPETEN has 416 staffs in total with 212 staffs allocated to technical units associated with regulatory functions and 204 staffs allocated to administrative units. For technical units, 94 staffs work in nuclear installations and materials area, 99 staffs work in radiation facilities and radioactive materials area and 19 staffs work in areas related to engineering support, management system and emergency preparedness.

Most of these persons have university degrees: doctoral degree 10 persons, master degree 111 persons, and bachelor degree 209 persons. The distribution of BAPETEN employees based on education is shown in Figure 7.



Figure 7. Range of Employees Education

It can be seen from Figure 8 that most of BAPETEN employees are at the age between 31 and 40 years old (62%). Only 9% of BAPETEN employees are at the age between 21 and 30 years old. To anticipate the introduction of nuclear power plants in Indonesia, BAPETEN needs to recruits and hires more young staff, especially with technical background. Then systematic training programme should be developed and implemented in order to enhance and maintain their competence.



Figure 8. Range of Employees Age

Generally, BAPETEN recruits and hires staff based on their expertise in specific technical disciplines. The technical expertise of staff in specific disciplines is derived from their education, special training and experience.

Furthermore, in order to define competence gap and continuously improve the training program, BAPETEN implements Training Need Assessment (TNA) for all BAPETEN personnel periodically. BAPETEN has conducted certain steps of TNA based on Safety Report Series No. 79 (Managing the Competence of the Regulatory Body) as follows:

1. Defining tasks: In 2011, BAPETEN reviewed, assessed and reformulated all of the job description for its technical staff who performs regulatory functions by adapting IAEA TecDoc-1254.

2. Developing required competencies: In 2012-2013, BAPETEN developed required competencies for its technical staff who perform regulatory functions by adapting IAEA's SARCoN questionnaires.

3. Assessing existing competencies: Also in 2013, BAPETEN conducted self-assessment to find out the existing competencies of all technical staff.

4. Analyzing competence gap: Early 2014, BAPETEN conducted competence gap analysis using SARCoN tools.

Management system of the regulatory body

BAPETEN has established the BAPETEN Management System, or BMS (BCR 10 Year 2011). The BMS incorporates ISO 9001:2008 and ISO 9004: 2009 standards but BAPETEN is not formally certified

against the standards. The top level document is the paper-based manual, which includes the policy statement of the organization, a description of the management system and the structure of the organization. The manual also includes the mission and vision statements of BAPETEN. Safety and security is included in the vision but not further specified in the BMS, e.g. through establishment of safety goals.

The document hierarchy is (from the top): a) the manual; b) three types of procedures (quality, administrative, general); c) work instructions; d) forms; and, e) records and reports. Procedures can be found on the BAPETEN's intranet.

The manual indicates that the Chairman of BAPETEN promotes continuous improvement (Article 3). It is emphasized in the manual that the Executive Secretary has the responsibility to plan, implement, monitor, assess, analyze, review and improve the BMS as necessary to ensure: a) conformity to the tasks of BAPETEN; b) consistency of the BMS; and, c) continually improve the effectiveness of the BMS.

Presidential Decree No. 76 of 1998, which establishes BAPETEN, gives the task to conduct outreach activities related to the safety and health of workers and the public, and to environmental protection, to BAPETEN. The website of BAPETEN is used to inform the public about its roles, responsibilities and activities. BAPETEN prepares an annual report of its activities and publishes it through its website.

BAPETEN are obeying and implementing Act Number 14 year 2008 of Openness public information. Act No. 14 of 2008 states that a government official has obligations to provide an opportunity for public to have an information related to function, task and activities for each Government Institution including BAPETEN. Based on the Act Number 14 year 2008, BAPETEN has issued BCR Number 9 year 2012 in implementing the Act. According to the BCR Number 9 year 2012, BAPETEN provides information to public related to Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Installation.

Indonesia plans to utilize external technical support organizations and contractors to support its nuclear power programme. Although BAPETEN has experience in regulating research reactor, it does not have any experience in licensing and inspecting nuclear power plants. In the past, BAPETEN had utilized some technical support services, mostly from Indonesian universities.

BAPETEN has an internal specific center to support licensing activities when an independent analysis is needed. In the case of an application for a license to build a nuclear power plant, the Directorate of Licensing of NIM processes the application and conducts the review and assessment. If and when the Directorate of Licensing of NIM needs independent analysis of the safety aspects of the NPP, the support is requested from the Regulation Assessment Centre for NIM. BAPETEN's long term vision is to establish comprehensive in-house capability to be able to conduct almost all essential review and assessment work and independent analysis. Until the capability is established, external organizations will continue to be utilized for support.

Place of the regulatory body in the governmental structure

BAPETEN is an independent statutory agency. This is outlined in Presidential Decree Number 103 Year 2001 on Non Departmental Government Institutions, as amended by Presidential Decree Number 9 Year 2004;

Reporting obligations

It establishes BAPETEN as a non-governmental agency which is responsible directly to the President. The concept of a central nuclear regulatory body positioned under the President minimizes the possibility of conflicting responsibilities and should provide this authority with effective independence.

Means for the effective separation

Based on Act No. 10 Year 1997, there are separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy. The Act states that the Government establishes an Executing Body, under and directly responsible and report to the President of The Republic of Indonesia. The executing Body shall have the task to execute the use of nuclear energy. The Regulatory Body shall have the task to control any activity using nuclear energy.

Article 9 Responsibility of License Holder

Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its responsibility

Prime responsibility for safety

In accordance to GR No. 54 Year 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation, the prime responsibility of the safety in the nuclear energy utilization lies on the license holder, and this responsibility cannot be delegated.

Discharging the prime responsibility for safety

GR No. 54 Year 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation Also requires the licensee to be responsible in implementing safety. These responsibilities are:

a) achieving the safety objective;

b) establishing and performing policy according to the safety objective;

c) determining the safety criteria;

d) assuring the safety in utilizing the nuclear material;

e) establishing, performing, and developing internal procedures and provision to ensure safety;

f) creating an organization with task, authorization, responsibility, and clear communication path;

g) establishing and ensuring that the personnel have the appropriate competency and skills with their task field; and

h) Performing evaluation, monitoring, and periodically auditing all items related to safety.

Regulatory mechanism to ensure that the license holder discharges its prime responsibility for safety

The regulatory body performs inspection to the license facility in order to evaluate safety performance and ensuring that the license holder discharge its prime responsibility for safety. The inspection can be done regularly with announcement, or without unannounced, and the schedule can be based on the situation or progress of the facility. BAPETEN carries out this inspection through document audits, interviews, witnessing and walkthrough.

Mechanisms for the license holder to maintain transparency and openness

The license holders convey the activity of transparency and openness of operating reactor on their website. Figure 9 is shown the implementation of BATAN to give information of nuclear energy promotion to public by that website. The activity of transparency and openness is including a schedule of reactor inspection, operation and maintenance.



Figure 9. Website of BATAN

BATAN also conduct public communication to public and stakeholder regarding the development of nuclear development in nearby area of site. Figure 10 is shown public consultation performed by BATAN.

Figure 10. Public consultation performed by BATAN (2015)

Ensuring that the license holder has appropriate resources

To ensure that the licensee of the nuclear facility has appropriate resources (technical, human, financial), it has been stipulated in BCR 4 Year 2010 that a licensee must allocate adequate resources to implement, to conduct, to assess, and to improve continuously a management system. In addition, the licensee of the nuclear facility has powers for the effective on-site management of an accident and mitigation of its consequences, has been stipulated in GR No. 54 Year 2012 and BCR 1 Year 2010.

Article 10 Priority to Safety

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engaged in activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that give due priority to nuclear safety

Regulatory requirements

Regulatory requirements regarding policies and programmes to be used by the licensee to prioritize safety in activities for design, construction and operation of nuclear installations are stipulated in:

- GR No 54 Year 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation;
- GR No. 2 Year 2014 on the Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials;
- BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on the Management System for Nuclear Facilities and Activities; and
- BCR No 2 Year 2011 on the Provision of the Operational Safety of Non Power Reactor.

These regulations set the basis and requirements for the licensee related to the establishment of safety policies, safety culture programmes and development, arrangements for safety management, arrangements for safety monitoring and self-assessment, independent safety assessments, discussion on measures to improve safety culture, a process oriented (quality) management system, as described in more detail below.

Safety policy

GR No 54 Year 2012 on The Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation put the bases to the licensees to establish their safety policies. The GR requires the licensees to put high priority to safety in all of their activities and facilities. The prime responsibility of lies on the license holder, and management at all levels including staff shall demonstrate its commitment to safety.

BATAN as a licensee of three reactors has also established it safety policies and safety culture programme in BATAN Chairman Regulation No. 200 Year 2012. BATAN has stated in its safety policy that high priority is given to safety in all of its activities to achieve zero accident to protect workers, facilities, public and environment from any potential hazard. All staffs are obligated to seek the safety goal achievement appropriate to their roles and responsibilities. This safety policy is then implemented in all three reactors.

Safety culture programme and development

As it has been regulated in GR No. 54 Year 2012, the licensee has to establish and implement the safety culture programme as a part of their management system. More detailed provisions related

to safety culture are stipulated in BCR No. 4 Year 2010. In this regulation, the management system shall be used by licensee to promote and support a strong safety culture by:

- ensuring a common understanding of the key aspects of safety culture within the organization;
- providing the means by which the organization supports individuals and teams in carrying out their tasks safely and successfully, taking into account the interaction between individuals, technology and the organization;
- reinforcing a learning and questioning attitude at all levels of the organization; and
- providing the means by which the organization continually seeks to develop and improve its safety culture.

Arrangements for safety management

Arrangement for safety management is stipulated in GR No. 54 Year 2012 which consists of licensee's responsibilities, management system and human factor.

In this report, the licensee's responsibilities related to safety are explained in the Article 9 on Responsibility of License Holder, and the licensee's management system is explained in the Article 13 on Quality Assurance, and the human factor is explained in Article 12 on Human Factor.

Arrangements for safety monitoring and self-assessment

The licensee's obligation to perform safety monitoring and self-assessment is stated in the GR No. 54 Year 2012 and BCR No 4 Year 2010. The GR requires the licensee to perform periodic safety review to its installation. Based on this regulation, responsibility to conduct safety monitoring and self-assessment lies on the license holder. The self-assessment has to be routinely and continually performed to confirm the ability of the processes to achieve the intended results and to identify opportunities for safety culture improvement.

Independent safety assessments

BCR No 4 Year 2010 states that license holder is responsible to the implementation of independent safety assessment. The independent assessment has to be performed regularly by independent external organization on behalf of the license holder is aimed to:

- evaluate the effectiveness of processes in meeting and fulfilling goals, strategies, plans and objectives;
- determine the adequacy of work performance and leadership;
- evaluate the organization's safety culture;
- monitor product quality; and

- identify opportunities for improvement.

Beside that, GR No. 54 Year 2014 requires the licensee to establish safety committee that has responsibility to conduct safety assessment and suggest recommendation to the license's holder related to the design, construction, operation safety.

Discussion on measures to improve safety culture

The licensees have to continually improve safety culture as required in the BCR No. 4 Year 2010. Measures to improve safety culture shall be identified based on the self-assessment and independent assessment. Actions to improve the processes shall be selected, planned and recorded. Focused group discussion in all levels is also use to communicate safety culture performance, assessment, and improvement. Benchmarking through regional meetings, such as the IAEA Asia Nuclear Safety Network, is also encouraging this improvement measures.

A process oriented (quality) management system

A provision process oriented (quality) management system is stipulated in BCR No 4 Year 2010, that requires the licensee to implement process oriented (quality) management system. It should be noted here that BCR No 4 Year 2010 is fully adopting the IAEA GS-R-3. Hence, this regulation requires that the processes of the management system that are needed to achieve the goals, provide the means to meet all requirements and deliver the products of the organization shall be identified, and their development shall be planned, implemented, assessed and continually improved. The sequence and interactions of the processes shall be determined. Furthermore the methods necessary to ensure the effectiveness of both the implementation and the control of the processes shall be determined and implemented.

Licensees Good Practices and safety culture achievements

BATAN as the license holder of three reactors has established its internal regulation related to safety culture, BATAN Chairman Regulation No. 200 Year 2012 on Guidance on Safety Culture Implementation. BATAN Safety culture implementation consists of safety policies establishment, safety culture programme development and implementation, capacity building, and safety culture assessment. Based on the BATAN Regulation, all working units in BATAN establish and implement the safety culture programme. Based on the current BATAN self-assessment on safety culture performance, it can be concluded that BATAN has achieved Level II of safety culture, and in its way to achieve Level III. This is very encouraging development.

The more specific development and implementation of safety culture programme in each reactor can be described are as follows:

<u>MPR GA Siwabessy Reactor</u>

The management and staff of MPR GA Siwabessy Reactor state their commitment to protecting workers, facilities, communities and the environment from potential harm by applying Health and

Safety Environment (HSE) in accordance with applicable legislation and always put safety in a high priority on its activities to achieve the of zero workplace accidents and occupational diseases target in a sustainable manner. Each of MPR GA Siwabessy employees, contractors, suppliers, customers, visitors, and guests must show commitment and be proactive in the implementation of HSE corresponding to their roles, duties and responsibilities.

Principles used in the implementation of MPR GA Siwabessy's Safety Policy are to:

1. understand and implement safety regulations and conduct safety programs with adequate resources allocation;
2. coordinate and actively control the safety of employees and the environment as well as working based-on procedure;
3. follow up the safety irregularities reports and resolve it with coordination at the organization level;
4. implement standard operating procedure and ensure the proper and appropriate use of protective equipment;
5. complete the safety infrastructure;
6. understand the duties, responsibilities, hazards and risks of activities;
7. understand the activities and compliance with safety requirements; and
8. maintain the cleanliness and tidiness of the workplace and implement the 5R programme: ***R****ingkas* (Simple), ***R****api* (Tidy), ***R****esik* (Clean), ***R****awat* (Maintain), and ***R****ajin* (Diligent).

Figure 11 shows some activities in MPR GA Siwabessy BATAN that are dedicated to foster the safety culture are as follows: socialization and promotion of safety culture, development of safety culture document such as 5R slogan and Behavior Based Safety (BBS), and safety Communication Programme such as daily meeting, safety forum, meeting review.

Figure 11. Safety culture activity performed by BATAN (2015)

TRIGA 2000 Reactor

TRIGA 2000 Reactor also has established safety culture programme and has been conducted safety monitoring through coordination meeting on safety culture regularly and updating information on the HSE board regularly. Assessment of safety culture, security, and stakeholder satisfaction is conducted every year and incorporated into the management target. Internal control is done through internal audit, inspection and HSE evaluation.

Figure 12. HSE Board Reactor TRIGA 2000

Some good practices in the implementation of safety culture are as follows:

- the application of Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Determining Control (HIRADC) on all routine and non-routine activity;
- briefing on safety, security and environment to contract workers and student;
- integration of safety and environmental aspects into SOP; and
- safety aspects included in the employment contract.

Kartini Reactor

For the implementation in Kartini Reactor, BATAN has established safety culture programme and has been conducted safety monitoring through Evaluation of Reactor Operation Activity, Evaluation of Audit Results, and Safety Culture Self-Assessment.

Some activities in Kartini Reactor that are dedicated to foster the safety culture are as follows:

1. socialization and promotion of safety culture;
2. development of safety culture document such as 5R slogan and BBS;
3. safety communication programme such as daily meeting and safety forum;
4. leadership programme, and establishment of agent of change (CAMAT);

5. safety workshop and training;
6. safety behavior internalization; and
7. safety awards.

Regulatory processes for monitoring and oversight

BAPETEN performs monitoring and oversight of arrangements used by the licensee to prioritize safety through licensing and inspection process. In the licensing process, BAPETEN reviews the safety policies of the licensee through management system of the licensee and conduct inspection to verify the implementation of the management system. Particularly, BAPETEN also performs survey and interview to the all level of the licensee's organization related to the implementation of safety culture programme.

Means used by the regulatory body to prioritize safety in its own activities

The provision for the BAPETEN priority to safety in its own activities is established in its internal regulation No. 14 year 2014 on Management System of Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency. Practically, BAPETEN priority to safety is implemented in its main task through risk based inspection. The more risk of the facility or activity, the more comprehensive and frequent inspection conducted by BAPETEN.

Article 11 Financial and Human Resources

1. *Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation throughout its life.*
2. *Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its life.*

Article 11 (1) Financial resources

Provision of financial resources

Based on GR No. 2 Year 2014 on the Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials, financial requirement is one of the licensing requirements for the construction, commissioning and operation of commercial power reactor or commercial non power reactor.

In principle, the financial requirements are design to guarantee the safe operation of nuclear installation and the performance of decommissioning at the end of the cycle, and to provide the liability for nuclear damage. Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy describes this liability of nuclear damage specifically, and the value can be revise time to time in accordance to special drawing rate justification through President Regulation.

For obtaining a construction and operation license, the financial requirements include: time deposit in Government banks, guarantee letter from Government or private national bank, or saving account. Meanwhile, the financial requirements to obtain a commissioning and operation license, include liability for nuclear damage insurance or other financial security, and financial guarantee to implement decommissioning.

Statement of adequacy

The adequacy of financial requirements described above are subject for evaluation by the Ministry of Finance, the National Agency for Development Plan, and other main stakeholders such as BATAN during the development of GR No. 2 Year 2014. Furthermore, the President Regulation detailing the limit of liability of nuclear damage is also a subject for periodic review initiated by the regulatory body, depending on the special drawing rate.

Financial requirement assessment

Assessment to financial requirements is not only performed by the regulatory body in ensuring the safe operation of nuclear installation and the performance of decommissioning at the end of the cycle, and to provide the liability for nuclear damage.

Financial resources availability in the event of a radiological emergency

Act No. 10 Year 1997 stated that the fund for liability of nuclear damage shall be available within seven days following the declaration of nuclear accident by the Chairman of BAPETEN. In this case, the Chairman shall make this declaration within 3 days after a nuclear accident. The Ministry of Finance and the National Agency for Development Plan also perform this assessment to ensure that development of nuclear installation is justified and in accordance to international standards.

Article 11 (2) Human resources

Regulatory requirements

Act No. 10 Year 1997 required that all employees operating a nuclear reactor shall be subjected for obtaining a working permit from the regulatory body. These requirements leads to the establishment of BCR No. 6 Year 2013 on the Working Permits for Personnel of Nuclear Installation and Materials, which arrange staffing, qualification, training and retraining mechanism. These safety related personnel include Reactor Operator, Reactor Supervisor, Radiation Protection Officer (RPO), Maintenance Officer, and Nuclear Material Officer.

Competence analysis method

In developing general and specific requirements for obtaining working permit, BAPETEN considers knowledge, skill and attitude needed to perform these safety related personnel. Based on these requirements, the operator (applicant) performs gap analysis for their personnel and training needs assessment. When the candidate for obtaining working permit has fulfill all of these requirements, then the operator submit an application to the regulatory body. Then, BAPETEN review this fulfilment before a test for obtaining the personnel license can be organized.

Training and retraining

According to BCR No. 6 Year 2013 on the Working Permits for Personnel of Nuclear Installation and Materials, the operator has an obligation to perform initial training and retraining to all the staff. In this case, the existing operator (BATAN) performed training needs assessment before organize any training and retraining needs by the staff. BATAN has a bureau of human resources and training center facilities for this purposes. For commercial power plant, this BCR requires the use of simulator training and test for many scenarios, such as normal operation, transients, design bases accidents, beyond design bases accidents, and operation management.

Plant simulator

Currently a full scale plant simulator is not available for the three research reactor in Indonesia. For training purposes BATAN has developed a simple computer program to demonstrate reactor operation parameters.

Training of maintenance and technical support staff

As stated previously, training and qualification for maintenance officer and technical support staff (such as RPO) are required by the above BCR. The training and qualification program includes preparation of safety related systems and components needed for operation; preparation of personal protective equipment, materials, tools and measurement apparatus; implementation procedures; isolation systems; and warning notes and signs.

Improvements to training programmes

In order to response generation gap problem in the operator side, BATAN improves their training program with the use of coaching methods and computer based training. Coaching is found to be a useful process in developing competency for operator and supervisor reactor, especially to face the fact that most of senior operator and supervisor is due to retirement in the near future. Computer based training is also important part of nuclear knowledge management.

Staff sufficiency assessment

The operator as required by national law regarding staffing, has to fulfill J1 & J2 form or Staff Position Analysis. In this case, J1 is analysis of number of staff needed with specific duties and competency requirements, and J2 is the number of staff available fulfilling all competency requirements in this position. Hence, this is a form of gap analysis, both quantitative and qualitative ways.

Contracted personnel and assessing their qualification and training

In principle, BATAN only contract external support personnel for their specific competency that is not available in BATAN but is related to nuclear safety, for example in performing site evaluation in a certain aspect, and in making conceptual and detail design for a specific type of power research reactor. BATAN requirements for these contracted personnel usually related to educational background, publication and working experiences, and certification. Assessment by BATAN on the fulfillment of these requirements is a national obligation before the contract can be made.

National experts in nuclear science and technology

National experts are mostly supplied by universities and research institute, which in this case is BATAN and BAPETEN. In this instance, Gadjah Mada University (UGM) has a nuclear engineering department; Bandung Institute of Technology has a nuclear science program under Department of Physics; and, University of Indonesia has a Health Physics Department, which is related to radiation protection.

Competence analysis for severe accident management staff

For the fact that Indonesia operates three research reactors and considers to build nuclear power programme, then building competence in severe accident management is regarded as an important subject. In 2014, Indonesia established I-CoNSEP (Indonesia Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness). This initiative is mainly aimed to improve the national capabilities in nuclear security and emergency preparedness, through a better coordination among stakeholders, training and exercise, technical support, and infrastructure development. Competence analysis, especially for anticipating severe accident, is one of the top priorities in the I-CoNSEP forum. Knowledge, skill and attitude requirements; gap analysis; training needs assessment; and four quadrant model are very important tools of analysis in this challenge.

Regulatory review and control activities

BAPETEN as the regulator established BCR No. 6 Year 2013, a regulation regarding training, retraining, qualification and certification of operator staff related to safety. Then, BAPETEN perform witnessing and review of training programme organized by the operator, before a personnel licensing to obtain working permit can be implemented. BAPETEN also performs review and assessment of human resource adequacy in Periodic Safety Review (PSR) document submitted by the operator to renew the operating license.

Article 12 Human Factors

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and limitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of a nuclear installation

Overview of the Contracting Party's arrangements and regulatory requirements to take human factors and organizational issues into account for the safety of nuclear installations

In accordance to GR No. 54 Year 2012, licensees shall conduct human reliability analysis and develop training and education program to ensure consideration of human factors in nuclear installations. Human reliability analysis shall consider personnel qualification, health factor, task analysis, ergonomic factor, and man machine interface factor. In implementing training and education program, licensees shall establish personnel qualification, competency, and level of expertise in conducting site monitoring until decommissioning stage.

Consideration of human factors in the design of nuclear installations and subsequent modifications

Based on GR No. 54 Year 2012, BCR No. 1 Year 2011 on Design Safety Provision of Non Power Reactor, and BCR No. 3 Year 2011 on Design Safety Provision of Power Reactor, human factors and man machine interface shall be considered in the design of nuclear installations and its subsequent modifications.

Methods and programmes of the license holder for analyzing, preventing, detecting and correcting human errors in the operation and maintenance of nuclear installations;

Nuclear installations in Indonesia have stated method and program for analysing, preventing, detecting and correcting human errors during operation and maintenance on their respective management system documents as required in BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on Management System for Facilities and Activities. Licencees are responsible for corrective action of nonconformity found. Corrective actions shall first identify nonconformity that could potentially reduce performance of the organization. Licensees define and implement prevention action to eliminate possible cause of nonconformity. Status and effectiveness of all corrective actions and preventions are monitored and reported.

Self-assessment of managerial and organizational issues by the operator

Self-assessment of managerial and organizational issues are performed based on BCR No. 4 Year 2010. Self-assessment are performed by international organization within licensee organization periodically and continuously to evaluate the quality and safety culture consideration during the work performed

Arrangements for the feedback of experience in relation to human factors and organizational issues

Arrangements for feedback of experience has been conducted in the facility as a mean of knowledge preservation and written as knowledge management program. Licensees take into account lesson learned from experiences of other organizations and also past operation and maintenance experience of the facility.

Regulatory review and control activities.

BAPETEN performs review and assessment of human factor in the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) document submitted by the operator to renew the operating license. BCR No. 2 Year 2015 on the Verification and Safety Assessment of Non Power Reactor requires the licensee to submit the review of human factor design and human factor (analysis of human reliability and training programme).

Article 13 Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance programmes are established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear installation.

Overview of the Contracting Party's arrangements and regulatory requirements for quality assurance programmes, quality management systems, or management systems of the license holder

GR No. 2 Year 2014 stated that integrated management system (IMS) is one of the licensing requirements of the licensing of nuclear facilities in each stages, from siting to decommissioning. The implementing instrument of IMS is detailed in BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on the Management System for Nuclear Facilities and Activities, which is fully adopting the IAEA GS-R-3. In the case of siting, GR No. 2 Year 2014 requires the applicant shall submit Management System for Site Evaluation (MSSE) document for approval prior to site evaluation project implementation. During site evaluation, then the licensee is required to apply and demonstrate the effectiveness of this MSSE document. Finally, report of this application shall be submitted to BAPETEN for obtaining site license.

Status of implementation of integrated management systems at nuclear installations

All nuclear facilities have established the IMS in 2012 and implement it until then. Besides applying BCR No. 4 Year 2010, all nuclear facilities voluntarily initiate to implement OHSAS 18001 and ISO 14000, and all supporting laboratory applying ISO 17025.

Main elements of management system

Main elements of IMS are: The establishment of IMS, including grading and commitment to safety culture; Management responsibility; Resources Management; Process Implementation; and, Measurement, Assessment, and Improvement.

Audits of vendors and suppliers by the license holders

All the licensees have carried out periodic internal IMS audit based on BCR No. 4 Year 2010. The management of TRIGA-2000 performed quality audit to its supplier who produces new type of control rods (without fuel follower).

Regulatory review and control activities

Regulatory review and control activities performed by BAPETEN includes: conducts of IMS/QA audit/inspection for nuclear facility and supplier having the activities and supplying the safety related system, structures and components. As the result, in early 2014 BAPETEN approved MSSE of the Experimental Power Plant site evaluation project in Serpong (35 km to the South West of Jakarta). The issuance of this approval was followed by several IMS/QA audits by BAPETEN. Other result of this regulatory review and control activities is that by the end of 2013 BAPETEN requested all nuclear installations to review and improve their IMS and Safety Culture. In early 2014, the licensee then developed action plans, then demonstrate the application and report the progress regularly to BAPETEN.

Article 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

i. Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such assessments shall be well documented, subsequently updated in the light of operating experience and significant new safety information, and reviewed under the authority of the regulatory body;

ii. Verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure that the physical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordance with its design, applicable national safety requirements, and operational limits and conditions.

Article 14 (1) Assessment of safety

Regulatory requirements

Regulatory requirements to perform comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are stipulated in:

- GR No. 2 Year 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installation and Utilization of Nuclear Material
- GR No. 54 Year 2012 on The Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation
- BCR No 2 Year 2015 on Verification and Safety Assessment of Non Power Reactor

The provisions for the licensee to perform comprehensive and systemic safety assessments are established in GR No. 2 Year 2014 and GR No. 54 Year 2012. GR No.2 Year 2014 requires the licensee to submit a set of documents with the application that depends on the reactor life-cycle phase. Those documents include the information of safety aspect of siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning activities of nuclear installations. The types of documents include administrative, technical, and financial. Technical documents to be submitted to BAPETEN to obtain a license in each phase are mainly to demonstrate the safety of the installation. In the siting phase, licensee has to submit Site Evaluation Report to demonstrate all factors at a site that could affect safety at the nuclear installation and the safety of its activities has been considered. This includes site characterization and consideration of factors that could affect the safety features of the nuclear installation or its activities and result in a release of radioactive material and could affect the dispersion of such material in the environment.

Safety assessments within the licensing process

In the construction including design, and operation phases, safety analysis report has to be submitted to BAPETEN. More detailed provisions for the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is defined in BCR No 1 Year 2011 and BCR No 8 Year 2012. The SAR must contain the information related to characterization, postulated initiating events, analysis of the sequence of events and evaluation of the consequences of postulated initiating events, comparison of the results of the analysis with the

acceptance criteria and design limits, proof that the action of the automatic safety system combined with specific actions the operator is able to cope with the consequences, limiting conditions for operation, conduct of operation, analysis of safety systems and technical safety features, and analysis of confinement. The SAR is required to be updated for license renewal and when modifications are approved by BAPETEN.

The general safety principles and criteria for each stages of nuclear installation life-cycle are defined in GR No. 54 Year 2012, which consist of site monitoring, design and construction, commissioning, operation, modification, decommissioning; and safety verification and assessment.

Re-evaluation of hazards assumptions is conducted during the periodic safety review, which has to be carried out by the licensee during construction, commissioning, and operation of installation, as stipulated in the GR No. 54 Year 2012. The periodical safety review includes:

a. nuclear installation design
b. current condition of structure, system, and component;
c. equipment qualification;
d. aging; performance and operation experience feedback;
e. safety management and nuclear emergency preparedness program; and
f. environmental radiological impact.

The provision for a periodic safety review is outlined more detailed in BCR No 2 Year 2015 which requires the licensee to submit a report to BAPETEN every ten years. The contents of the periodic safety review report include organization and administration, procedures, current plant safety documents, operating experience feedback and lessons learned from incidents or occurrences, the condition of structures, systems and/or components, qualification of equipment, safety performance, nuclear emergency preparedness program, aging management program, radiation protection program, management system, data and information related to supervisor reactor, reactor operators, maintenance supervisors, and maintenance technicians, covering training, refreshment training and mutations, releases of radioactive effluents into the environment and the handling of radioactive waste.

Regulatory review and control activities

Currently, KARTINI, TRIGA 2000 and MPR GA Siwabessy are conducting the Periodical Safety Review using this BCR as the guidance. There is an agreement between licensee and BAPETEN on which safety factors will be reviewed and its extent.

(1) MPR GA Siwabessy

From 2013 to 2016 conducted several safety assessments which include:

1. Implementation of PSR;
2. Aging management;
3. Repair S-5 beam tube;

The PSR report will be submitted at the end of 2017

(2) TRIGA 2000 Reactor

In 2000 TRIGA reactor, safety reassessments have been carried out as follows:

1. Retrofitting of the reactor building;
2. Conducting measurements of the reactor tank thickness;
3. Testing of Non-FFCR Control Rod;
4. function test of all equipment in the main control room, eg. I & C test.

The PSR report will be submitted at the end of 2016.

(3) Kartini Reactor

Kartini reactor has done several safety assessments as follows:

1. Retrofitting of the reactor building;
2. Implementation of PSR;
3. Aging management;
4. Safety assessment of the impact of the volcanic ash.

The PSR report will be submitted at the end of 2016.

Article 14 (2) Verification of safety

Regulatory requirements

Regulatory requirements for the verification of safety include:

1. GR No. 54 Year 2012 on The Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation;
2. BCR No. 2 Year 2015 on Verification and Safety Assessment of Non Power Reactor;
3. BCR No.8 Year 2008 on Safety Provision of Non Power Reactor Aging Management.

GR No. 54 Year 2012 and BCR No.2 Year 2015 stipulates requirements for safety verification and assessments for all stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations. Safety verification has to be performed through analysis and surveillance which include:

a. implementation of management system in each stage of activities;
b. design confirmation by independent team;
c. review of site related factors;
d. continuous surveillance during commissioning and operation nuclear installations including environmental monitoring; and
e. Assessment of modification and its control.

Main elements of programmes for continued verification of safety

Licensee of all reactors implement verification of safety (in-service inspection, surveillance, functional testing of systems, etc.) based on the licensing document that have been reviewed and approved by BAPETEN such as Operating Limit and Condition and Aging Management Program. BAPETEN perform routine inspection to ensure the implementation of the verification of safety and

particularly for MPR G.A. Siwabessy reactor, BAPETEN also perform online and real time monitoring of safety operational parameters.

Elements of ageing management programme(s)

More detail provision on aging management programme is stipulated in the BCR No.8 Year 2008 on Safety Provision of Non Power Reactor Aging Management. Based on this BCR, the licensee shall establish aging management program which consist of several steps, i.e.: Screening of SSC's, Program surveillance, Data Collection and Evaluation of Aging. Aging analysis report has to be submitted to BAPETEN as a requirement for license renewal.

Arrangements for internal review by the license holder of safety cases to be submitted to the regulatory body

Arrangements for internal review of safety cases by the licensee that has to be submitted to the regulatory body is stipulated in GR 54 Year 2012. The internal review for safety cases carried out by safety committee which is independent from the licensee organization.

During the construction, commissioning, and operational phase of reactor, the licensees are allowed to conduct modification. For safety related SSC modification, the licensee has to submit approval application to BAPETEN prior to the modification. More detail provision on modification is stipulated in BCR No. 5 Year 2012 on Safety in Non Power Reactor Utilization and Modification.

Regulatory review and control activities

BAPETEN review to the licensee's Assessment and Verification of Safety is performed through review and assessment of the license renewal application document, particularly in the Report of Periodic Safety Review. BAPETEN also conducts inspections to ensure that licensees always maintain compliance to the programmes for continued verification of safety (in-service inspection, surveillance, functional testing of systems, etc.) as stipulated in the administrative requirements of Operational Limit and Condition.

BAPETEN held the National Workshop on Periodic Safety Review Programme Research Reactor-Establishment and Implementation on 2-6 December 2013 that is shown in Figure 13. This workshop are followed by BATAN and BAPETEN staff which is related to preparing and evaluating a document Periodic Safety Review.

Figure 13. IAEA National Workshop on PSR in Indonesia

Article 15 Radiation Protection

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states the radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed prescribed national dose limits.

Regulatory requirements

The GR No. 33 Year 2007 has adopted some important principles from IAEA BSS-115, i.e justification of practices, dose limitation and optimization of protection and safety. Dose limits have been set for radiation workers, apprentices and the public. To implement the optimization principle, BAPETEN includes the provision of dose constraint into the GR. The licensee shall make a radiation protection programme and implement the ALARA principle through the monitoring and maintaining the dose of workers to be agreed with the dose constraint and below the dose limit, and monitoring the release of radioactive materials into the environment.

The GR governs that the licensee shall continuously, periodically and/or incidentally monitor the environmental radioactivity. The level of environmental radioactivity shall not exceed the environmental radioactivity limit established in the BCR No. 7 Year 2013. Besides that, GR No. 2 Year 2014 requires the licensee to submit the plan and report of environmental management and monitoring.

Regulatory expectations for the license holder's processes to optimize radiation doses and to implement the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle

In order to improve assurance on safety for harmful impact to the environment, BAPETEN has amended several implementing regulations such as BCR No. 1 Year 1999 on Provision of Working Safety against Radiation into BCR No.4 Year 2013 on Radiation Protection and Safety in Nuclear Utilizations.

Document of radiation protection programme is one of technical requirements to obtain a license/approval from BAPETEN. The Licensee is required to implement radiation protection programme, and to measure that occupational dose is ALARA. The BCR 4 of 2013 requires licensee to implement optimization radiation doses through establishment of dose constraint for worker and public. Dose constraint is implemented in the construction phase and operation and decommissioning or closure of nuclear installation, which is established as part of radiation protection programme.

Implementation of radiation protection programmes by the licence holders

In general, BATAN as a licensee established BATAN standard No. 16 year 2014 on radiation safety and protection, to implement radiation protection measures and environmental management and monitoring in order to meet the requirements set out in the regulations. Licensees have established dose constraint and discharge limit for each nuclear areas. Maximum radiation dose and average for radiation workers in nuclear installation are shown in Figure 14, Table 1, and Table 2 below.



Figure 14. Maximum and average radiation doses in nuclear installation

Table 1. Radiation doses received by worker (Year 2014)

Installation	Number of radiation workers	Maximum doses (mSv)	Average doses (mSv)
MPR 30	137	7.55	0.21
TRIGA 2000	105	3	1.07
Kartini	219	2.21	1.25

Table 2. Radiation doses received by worker (Year 2015)

Installation	Number of radiation workers	Maximum doses (mSv)	Average doses (mSv)
MPR 30	140	3.59	0.25
TRIGA 2000	99	1.03	0.55
Kartini	216	1.01	0.45

From Table 1 and Table 2 above, it can be concluded that no workers receive doses (in a year) beyond dose limit as required in BCR 4 Year 2013 (20 mSv/year). BATAN have implemented well a radiation protection measures and monitor in order to meet the requirements set out in the regulations

Regulatory review and control activities

BAPETEN review to the licensee's protection and radiation safety is performed through review and assessment of the license application document and renewal application document, particularly in the protection and radiation safety document, safety analysis report (chapter radiation protection), also in the report of Periodic Safety Review. BAPETEN also conducts inspections of radiation protection scope to ensure that licensees always maintain compliance to their documents.

BAPETEN also developed a worker doses evaluation reporting system. This system are evaluate and monitor doses all of personnel who works in nuclear installation, as shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15. Main menu of doses evaluation reporting system

Article 16 Emergency Preparedness

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and off-site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover the activities to be carried out in the event of an emergency

For any new nuclear installation, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences operation above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body

i. *Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as they are likely to be affected by a radiological emergency, its own population and the competent authorities of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation arc provided with appropriate information for emergency planning and response.*

ii. *Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, insofar as they are likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be carried out in the event of such an emergency.*

Article 16 (1) Emergency plans and programmes

Overview of the Contracting Party's arrangements and regulatory requirements for an emergency preparedness

All nuclear installations in Indonesia are categorized into facilities with threat/hazard category II and III. The existing regulations, GR No. 54 Year 2012 and BCR No. 1 Year 2010, require the licensee to develop Emergency Plan and Response (EPR) programme based on threat/hazard assessment, and submit it to BAPETEN as one of the licensing requirements. The EPR programme should consist of infrastructure elements and response functions. The infrastructure elements consist of at least: organization, coordination, facility and equipment, response procedure, and nuclear emergency training and exercise. Meanwhile, the response functions consist of at least: identification, report, and activation; mitigation measures; urgent protective action; protective measures for personnel of nuclear emergency response, workers, public, and environment; and provide information and instruction to the public.

Based on the above regulations, the off-site EPR programme is divided into two levels. For provincial level, the programme should be established by the Chairman of Local Disaster Management Agency (LDMA) with coordination to related institutions and the licensee. For national level, the programme should be established by the Chairman of National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) with coordination to related national level institutions and the licensee. The EPR programme in both provincial and national level also consist of infrastructure elements and response functions, but with wider scope and application, including the arrangement of trans-boundary release from neighboring countries.

Overview and implementation of main elements of national plan

The main elements of EPR programme in all level stated in the existing regulations are in accordance to the IAEA GS-R-2 and IAEA Tecdoc 953. The mechanism of emergency declaration and the implementation of EPR programme in all levels has been reported in the previous report. The organizational structure of National Nuclear Emergency Response Organization (NNERO), shown in Figure 16, has been developed in 2006. The coordination activities among national institution in the structure are performed regularly.



Figure 16. The Organizational Structure of NNERO

Implementation of emergency preparedness measures by the license holders

It is required for the licensee to identify the immediate nuclear emergency and determine the appropriate level the classification of response of a nuclear emergency, such as make predictions or initial assessment of the size and the magnitude of releases of radioactive material to the environment. The licensees has developed Emergency Preparedness Program to ensure an effective emergency measures are taken should any emergency occurs. The licensee also perform a regularly exercise, not only involving on-site resources, but also involving off-site resources and institutions. Based on the regulation, the licensees are obliged to provide the facilities needed during an emergency, since they have the main responsibility during an emergency.

Training and exercises

Several exercises have been conducted:

1. Emergency response table-top exercise with scenario of severe accident at MPR-30 GA Siwabessy, in National Nuclear Crisis Center, BAPETEN, 2015.

2. Emergency response field exercise with scenario of severe accident at MPR-30 GA Siwabessy in Serpong, BATAN, 2015 (The picture is shown in Figure 17.)
3. Emergency response during an illicit trafficking involving radioactive materials, a joint exercise between BAPETEN and Indonesian Coast Guard, BATAM, 2016

Figure 17. Emergency exercise in Serpong, 2015.

Some lesson learned from the above exercises are it is realized the need to improve the coordination among stakeholders during an emergency response, and the capabilities of the most responders still need to be upgraded.

Regulatory review and control activities

Since 2014, BAPETEN launched an initiative called I-CoNSEP (Indonesia Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness). This initiative is mainly aimed to improve the national capabilities in nuclear security and emergency preparedness, through a better coordination among stakeholders, training and exercise, technical support, and infrastructure development.

Regulatory review and control activities performed by BAPETEN includes: conducts of emergency preparedness program audit/inspection for nuclear facility. As the result, all nuclear facility have the program in place, and perform an exercise regularly as stated in the regulation. BAPETEN also involved in several licensees exercise as observer, to make sure that the exercises have meet their objection as planned.

BAPETEN has registered its contact points in the Incident Emergency Center (IEC) reporting system. All contact points are made available 24 hour / 7 days should any information need to be shared. BAPETEN also participated regularly on ConvEx exercise held by the IEC, to maintain an effective communication.

Article 16 (2) Information of the public and neighboring States

Overview of the Contracting Party's arrangements for informing the public in the vicinity of the nuclear installations about emergency planning and emergency situations

The BCR No. 1 Year 2010 obliged the licensee to report to the chairman of BAPETEN in the event of a nuclear emergency and the report should be submitted not later than one (1) hour by telephone, facsimile or electronic mail, and in writing no later than 2 (two) days after an accident occurrences. It also required the licensees of category I and II facilities to inform and giving instruction to the public during an emergency, and this requirement consistent with IAEA standards.

Arrangements to inform competent authorities in neighboring States

The GR 54 Year 2012, required the chairman of BAPETEN as NCA-A (National Compentent Authority – Abroad) to inform the IAEA and the neighboring state governments, should any nuclear emergency occurs that might give impact to the neighboring states.

Article 17 Siting

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures are established and implemented

i. for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its projected lifetime;

ii. for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals, society and the environment;

iii. for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation;

iv. for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that installation and, upon request providing the necessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate and make their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear installation.

Article 17 (1) Evaluation of site related factors

Regulatory requirements

The Government of Indonesia takes necessary efforts to ensure that the future NPP site will comply with established requirements for site safety. In accordance with GR No. 2 Year 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Materials Utilization, site evaluation approval application shall be submitted together with its administrative and technical requirement documents. Site evaluation activity is one of the pre-requisite for issuing site license. Site evaluation approval application shall be submitted together with its administrative and technical requirement documents. In accordance with GR No. 54 Year 2012 on Safety and Security of Nuclear Installations, site monitoring of the nuclear installation shall be conducted in the construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning stage.

For implementing the above GR, BAPETEN has issued BCR No. 5 Year 2007 on Safety Provisions for Site Evaluation of Nuclear Reactor for a more detail provisions related to siting. In addition to the BCR No. 5 Year 2007, BAPETEN has also issued several BCR as guidance to conduct specific site evaluation in every aspects of site evaluation, namely:

a) BCR No. 8 of 2013 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspect of Seismology

b) BCR No. 4 of 2008 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspect of geotechnical

c) BCR No. 5 of 2015 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspect of Volcanology

d) BCR No. 6 of 2014 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspects of Meteorology and Hydrology

e) BCR No. 6 of 2008 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspects of human induced

f) BCR No. 3 of 2008 on the Nuclear Installation Site Evaluation in the Aspects of dispersion

From all aspects in site evaluation, there are two aspects that include site rejection criteria, which are seismic and volcano.

BAPETEN has developed standard review plan for inspection as a guide to the conduct of inspection, and BAPETEN also developed Standard Review Plan for reviewing licensing documents during siting stage for all siting aspects (seismic, geotechnical, volcanology, meteorology, hydrology, dispersion, and human induced event).

Regulatory review and control activities

BAPETEN conducts review of site evaluation approval application that will be submitted together with its administrative and technical requirement documents (site evaluation programme and management system for siting aspect). Site evaluation activity is one of the pre-requisite for issuing site license. To ensure that site evaluation is performed in accordance with site evaluation programme and site evaluation management system, BAPETEN perform inspection and verification of the site evaluation activities and has also involved third party as external TSO for review and assessment of the site license requirement documents.

Article 17 (2) Impact of the installation on individuals, society and environment

Right now BATAN is conducting site evaluation on location close to the existing Serpong Nuclear Area for its new Experimental Power Reactor. This activity is conducted after BATAN received site evaluation approval from BAPETEN. BAPETEN and BATAN have implemented several dissemination information on site evaluation activities and planning of that Experimental Power Reactor. In addition, BAPETEN and BATAN has to have stakeholder meeting with other government institution including local government including forestry and environment Ministry, Energy and Mineral Resource Ministry, and Industrial Ministry.

BAPETEN has conducted a review on site license requirement documents submitted by BATAN for Experimental Power Reactor in Serpong. To ensure that site evaluation is performed in accordance with Site Evaluation Program as well as Site Evaluation Management System, BAPETEN carried out field verification for site evaluation activities and also involved third party as external technical support organization for review and assessment of Site Evaluation Report.

For nuclear power plants, several site candidates have been identified and studied in detail. During 2014 – 2016, site study activities were performed in Kalimantan (West and East) and BATAM site.

1) In cooperation with the provincial government of West Kalimantan, BATAN has conducted a pre-survey to determine potential candidate sites for nuclear power plant. Based on the results of the preliminary study, several site candidates are obtained.
2) In East Kalimantan, from 2007 to 2009, a pre-survey had been done with the aim to obtain the areas of interest in East Kalimantan region. In 2016, BATAN has performed site visit and collect primary data for certain siting aspects.
3) In BATAM, the pre survey activities were carried out using secondary data which include DEM satellite imagery of BARELANG islands, morphological map, geological map, and hydrogeological map. It yields several interest area based on those pre-survey activity.

However up until now there are no official site licensing application being made from Kalimantan (West and East) and BATAM site.

Article 17 (3) Re-evaluation of site related factors

Ministry of Public Work has updated Indonesia earthquake map and it was found that earthquake potential increases all over Indonesia.

In Yogyakarta where Kartini Reactor located, possible Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) value increases from 0.15 g to 0.25 g. Regarding the increasing of PGA value, BATAN has performed retrofitting with column jacketing method to strengthen reactor structure that finished in 2015. In Bandung where TRIGA 2000 Reactor located, there is an issue of the Lembang Fault that raises concern for the safety of TRIGA 2000 Reactor. BATAN has performed retrofitting to its reactor structure too that finished in 2014. In Serpong to measure anticipated earthquake event, BATAN replaced its seismic accelerograph equipment in 2015.

Regulatory review and control activities

According to GR No. 54 Year 2012, the licensee shall perform safety verification and assessment during construction, commissioning, and operation stage of nuclear installation. In the operation stage, safety verification shall be performed through analysis and surveillance that consist of: review of the site-related factors, surveillance that is performed continuously during the commissioning and operation of a nuclear installation shall include monitoring of nuclear installation, and assessment to the modification of condition and its control.

Article 17 (4) Consultation with other Contracting Parties likely to be affected by the installation

BAPETEN and BATAN are periodically performed public consultation/socialization to public. Figure 18 is shown public consultation performed by BATAN.

Figure 18. Public consultation performed by BATAN (2015)

In addition, BAPETEN and BATAN has to have stakeholder meeting with other government institution including local government including forestry and environment Ministry, Energy and Mineral Resource Ministry, Environment Ministry, and Industrial Ministry.

International arrangements

Information on the site study activities for nuclear installation always being shared in IAEA forum. All IAEA members' countries will have access to this information. There is also regional network under IAEA such as ANSN where neighboring countries that could be potentially affected by nuclear installation that will be built can have direct shared information.

Article 18 Design and Construction

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

i. *the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels and methods of protection (defense in depth) against the release of radioactive materials, with a view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiological consequences should they occur;*

ii. *the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear installation are proven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;*

iii. *the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the man-machine interface.*

Article 18 (1) Implementation of defense in depth

In accordance with GR No. 54 Year 2012, construction activities shall be performed based on safety design principles. The basic safety principles include the inherent safety, multiple barriers, safety margin, redundancy, diversity, independence, fail-safe and safety qualification. The requirements of safety design shall be implemented from construction to decommissioning stage. Licensee, in order to accomplish design requirements, shall establish a classification for structure, system, and component of nuclear installation, based on safety class, quality class, and seismic class.

To comply with the design requirements, the licensee shall establish a classification of structures, systems and components of nuclear installations, based on the safety class, quality class and/or seismic class.

Based on GR No. 2 Year 2014, Licensee shall obtain a design approval from BAPETEN before applying for Construction permit by submitting the documents of Nuclear Reactor Detailed Design and Safety Analysis Report.

Based on GR No. 54 Year 2012, licensees are responsible to implement the principle of defense in depth effectively to achieve safety objectives.

BAPETEN is developing work instructions for inspection as guide to conduct inspection on the construction stage. Inspection is conducted to ensure that all SSCs under construction will satisfy the principle of defense in depth and be able to carry out their safety functions.

Article 18 (2) Incorporation of proven technologies

In accordance GR No. 2 Year 2014, construction of commercial power reactor shall fulfil the criteria as following: (a) all structures, systems and components important to safety in nuclear reactor has been tested in a relevant environment or in accordance with operating conditions, and applied in

the prototype; and (b) has been granted commercial operation license by the regulatory body from the state which has built a commercial nuclear power plant.

Inspectors will participate in evaluating the proposed reactor designs, including the evaluation of the technology applied to the design.

Article 18 (3) Design for reliable, stable and manageable operation

Overview of the Contracting Party's arrangements and regulatory requirements for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation

According to GR No. 54 Year 2012, licensee shall design reliable of SSC and easily manageable operation of nuclear installation.

Implementation measures taken by the license holder

In order to implement the GR No. 2 Year 2014, several BCRs on the Safety Provisions of NPPs design and construction have been revised referring to the current IAEA documents, i.e. BCR No. 3 year 2011 on Safety Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Reactors.

Regulatory review and control activities

BAPETEN conducts review of the design and construction of nuclear reactors through review on the license requirement documents, especially Reactor Main Data, Detail Design, Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the Periodic Safety Review (PSR). BAPETEN also conducts inspections to ensure that licensees always maintain compliance to the design requirements**.**

Article 19 Operation

i. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that: the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an appropriate safety analysis and a commissioning programme demonstrating that the installation, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;

ii. operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and operational experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for operation;

iii. operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted in accordance with approved procedures;

iv. procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to accidents;

v. necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;

vi. incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant licence to the regulatory body;

vii. programmes to collect and analyse operating experience are established, the results obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing mechanisms are used to share important experience with international bodies and with other operating organizations and regulatory bodies;

viii. the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear installation is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in activity and in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and waste directly related to the operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal.

Article 19 (1) Initial authorization

Regulatory requirements

Under GR No. 2 Year 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials, many technical requirements shall be submitted to the Regulatory Authority by the applicant to obtain a commissioning license. These requirements include: Safety analysis report, operational limits and conditions (OLC), commissioning programme; radiation protection and safety programme, safeguards system and physical protection documents, management system document or quality assurance programme for siting, ageing management programme, decommissioning programme, emergency preparedness and response programme, report of the environmental license implementation, report of construction activity results, and as-built drawing of the reactor.

Furthermore, on the content of commissioning programme, GR No. 54 Year 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation stated that the applicant shall establish and implement a commissioning programme to ensure that all structure, system and component (SSC) of the nuclear installation that has been built could function properly as its intended design.

Conduct of appropriate safety analyses

As it is mentioned previously, the applicant shall submit a safety analysis report (SAR) as one of the requirements in obtaining a commissioning license under GR No. 2 Year 2014. This report has to describe both qualitative and quantitative analysis, applying both deterministic and probabilistic methods (where applicable), for all areas of safety issues. BAPETEN has an experience in enacting BCR No. 8 Year 2012 on the SAR of Non Power Reactor, adopting the IAEA standards. With this experience, then BAPETEN sufficiently is confident to develop a BCR on the SAR of Power Reactor in the near future.

The current licensing procedure in BAPETEN obliges its evaluator to perform review and assessment of an SAR submitted by the applicant. The evaluation shall be done in accordance with the appropriate BCR or international best practice for each topic. In doing so, the evaluator may request assistance from both Center of Assessment (internal department) and external TSO, depending on the complexity of the problem and availability on internal resources (See discussion on the use of TSO in Article 8). Based on the review and assessment results, BAPETEN therefore publishes a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), describing how the applicant cope with all safety requirements. In the last five years, BAPETEN always established this SER to support decision making process for nuclear facility license. Except for its part related to proprietary and confidential information, the SER is available for public on request.

Commissioning programme

GR No. 54 Year 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation stated that commissioning programme submitted by the applicant shall describe an integrated testing procedure of the design for all systems operated with nuclear materials, means for both cold and hot test. In this procedure, the applicant shall perform verification to establish OLC in accordance with the general and the specific design requirements. On the OLC itself, BAPETEN has established BCR No. 3 Year 2009 on the OLC and Operational Procedure of Power Reactor.

Verification programme

It has been described earlier that both GR No. 2 Year 2014 and GR No. 54 Year 2012 stated that the applicant shall establish and implement a commissioning programme. This programme, inter alia, describes the requirement to perform verification in ensuring that the nuclear installation as constructed is consistent with design and safety requirements. In addition, all SSC of the nuclear installation that has been built could be functioned as its intended design.

Regulatory review and control activities

According to GR No. 2 Year 2014, BAPETEN performs review and assessment to licensing document for the commissioning phase. However, currently there is no commissioning license applied to BAPETEN. In order to prepare the introduction of NPP in Indonesia, BAPETEN already develop a plan for both international (with IAEA through TC Project) and bilateral cooperation (with advanced

country in nuclear energy and with potential countries of origin) to build its competency on the regulation of Nuclear Installation in commissioning phase.

Article 19 (2) Operational limits and conditions (OLC)

Regulatory requirements

OLC is one of the licensing requirements under GR No. 2 Year 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials. BAPETEN also established BCR No. 3 Year 2009 on the OLC and Operational Procedure of Power Reactor and BCR No. 9 Year 2013 on the OLC of Non Power Reactor. In these BCRs, the OLC shall describe operational provision for startup, high power operation, shutdown, maintenance, testing and refueling; limit and condition that assuring the safety system, including engineering safety features, will be well functioned in all condition of operation, including in accident condition; and, limit and condition that oblige the reactor operator and the supervisor, radiation protection officer, maintenance technician and the supervisor to take necessary actions. The licensee shall operate the nuclear installation in accordance with the OLC.

It should be mentioned also here that OLC is comprised of safety limit, safety system setting, limiting condition for operation, surveillance requirements, and administrative requirements. The last requirements are regarding organizational structure, personnel training and qualification, audit and review, procedure, records, reports, radiation safety, and modification; including actions have to be taken if there is a deviance from the limiting condition for operation and safety limit.

Implementation of OLC

All requirements for OLC as described in BCR No. 3 Year 2009 on the OLC and Operational Procedure of Power Reactor and in BCR No. 9 Year 2013 on the OLC of Non Power Reactor shall be used as a mandatory guideline document in operating the installation, and is a subject for verification and review by the regulatory body from time to time. The operator has to use it also as guide in developing their training and qualification programme for their staff. The BCRs also arranges that the OLC shall be available in the main control room and other place that easily accessed by safety related staff such as the reactor operator and the supervisor, radiation protection officer, maintenance technician and the supervisor.

Review and revision of OLC

In the operation of nuclear installation, it is possible for the operator to revise the OLC. This might be caused by modification activities, utilization changes, or uprating of the power. BCR No. 3 Year 2009 and BCR No. 9 Year 2013 stated that the operator cannot revise the OLC unless has an approval from BAPETEN. The revision of OLC shall be based on safety analysis and be assessed by the safety committee of the operator. Furthermore, GR No. 2 Year 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials regulates that should there is a revision of the OLC in the operation phase, then the operator shall apply a new license.

Regulatory review and control activities

GR No. 2 Year 2014, GR No. 54 Year 2012, BCR No. 3 Year 2009 and BCR No. 9 Year 2013 stated that the Licensee shall establish OLC that has been assessed by their safety committee before submitted to BAPETEN for obtaining commissioning and operation license. The OLC shall be specific for each unit of nuclear installation. BAPETEN performs review and assessment to licensing document for the commissioning phase, including LCO document. Again, currently there is no commissioning license applied to BAPETEN. To build its competency on the regulation of Nuclear Installation in commissioning phase. And in order to prepare the introduction of NPP in Indonesia, BAPETEN already develop a plan for both international (with IAEA through TC Project) and bilateral cooperation (with advanced country in nuclear energy and with potential countries of origin).

Article 19 (3) Procedures for operation, maintenance, inspection and testing

Regulatory requirements

In order to obtain an operation license, GR No. 2 Year 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installations and the Utilization of Nuclear Materials requires the applicant to submit many technical documents, such as: Safety analysis report, OLC, radiation protection and safety programme, safeguards system and physical protection documents, management system document or quality assurance programme for operation, decommissioning programme, emergency preparedness and response programme, and report of the environmental license implementation. Then, in implementing the operation of nuclear installation, GR No. 54 Year 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation stated that the licensee shall establish: OLC; procedure for operation; maintenance, surveillance and inspection programme; and ageing management programme. Moreover, BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on Management System for Facilities and Activities also required the licensee to perform necessary test, check, verification and validation during the operation or process management.

Operational procedures, their implementation, periodic review, modification, approval and documentation

According to GR No. 54 Year 2012 and BCR No. 3 Year 2009, the licensee shall establish operational procedures covering normal operation, anticipated transients, design bases accidents, and beyond design bases accident. For the implementation in normal operation, the procedures include for functional and performance test; loading, unloading and fuel movement inside the core; maintenance of SSC important to safety; inspection, calibration and surveillance of SSC important to safety; radiation protection activities; review and approval for operation and maintenance; operator response to anticipated transients, design bases accidents, and beyond design bases accident; emergency preparedness and response; physical protection; radioactive waste management and monitoring and control of radioactive release; modification and access control. All of these documents have to be reviewed periodically and updated based on the management system established by the licensee.

For safety review, based on BCR No. 3 Year 2009, the licensee shall implement it periodically covering on the design of nuclear installation, current condition of SSC, equipment qualification,

ageing, safety performance and operational experiences feedback, and radiological impacts to the environment.

BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on Management System for Facilities and Activities requires the licensee to develop procedure for modification, approval and documentation.

Availability of the procedures to the relevant nuclear installation staff

BCR No. 3 Year 2009 on the OLC and Operational Procedure of Power Reactor, clearly arranges that all approved procedures shall be available for relevant staff and can be reached easily. For example, written procedures for reactor operation have to be available in the control room.

Involvement of relevant nuclear installation staff in the development of procedures

BCR No. 3 Year 2009 and BCR No. 2 Year 2011 on the Safety Provision for Non Power Reactor clearly arrange the role and authority for manager, supervisor and operator in developing a procedure. Indeed, the responsibility in the establishment of procedure lies to the licensee. A flowchart describing the process of developing a procedure is also given in the BCR No. 3 Year 2009, including validation and verification steps before the establishment of the procedure.

Incorporation of operational procedures into the management system of the nuclear installation

BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on Management System for Facilities and Activities requires the licensee to develop procedure for document control and records. Hence, technical documents such as procedure for operation, together with procedure and other kind of documents, are incorporated into the integrated management system.

Regulatory review and control activities

All safety related documents established by the licensee, including records, are subject for review and/or audit by BAPETEN during the licensing and inspection process. Priorities are given to review and observe the implementation of procedure for operation, maintenance, inspection and testing, and other safety related procedures. Inspector may perform witnessing of the implementation of procedure; cross-checking the actual situation with the records, measurement and testing results; and interview relevant staff of the operator and their contractor/supplier.

Article 19 (4) Procedures for responding to operational occurrences and accidents

Regulatory requirements

As it's been stated previously, GR No. 54 Year 2012 and BCR No. 3 Year 2009 requires the licensee to establish operational procedures covering normal operation, anticipated transients, design bases accidents, and beyond design bases accident. For research reactor, a more detail requirements for this response can be found in BCR No. 2 Year 2011 on the Safety Provision for Non Power Reactor.

In the case of emergency situation, BCR No. 1 Year 2010 on the Emergency Preparedness and Response, which was developed adopting the IAEA standards, provides a systematic and step-by-step approach on preparedness and response procedures.

Event based and/or symptom based emergency operating procedures

BCR No. 3 Year 2009 stated that operation procedures for anticipated transients, DBA and BDBA have to describe instruction for recovering the facility. Depending on the accident scenarios developed in the SAR, then the operator may develop these emergency operating procedures using event based and/or symptom based approach.

Procedures and guidance to prevent severe accidents or mitigate their consequences

In preventing severe accidents, GR No. 54 Year 2012 describes that the use of defense in depth strategy is aimed to fulfil fundamental safety function of nuclear installation in controlling reactivity, removing heat from the core, and containing radioactive materials and shielding the radiation. This strategy shall be implemented by the licensee through their procedure and working instruction. On the issue of mitigating the consequences of severe accident, BCR No. 1 Year 2010 provides a systematic and step-by-step approach on preparedness and response procedures. These mitigation procedures have to be completed with relevant analyzing tools and computer codes, and with description of protective actions and evacuation schemes.

Regulatory review and control activities

All safety related documents established by the licensee (especially for responding to operational occurrences, preventing and responding accidents) are subject for review and/or audit by BAPETEN during the licensing and inspection process. Emergency Preparedness and Response, and Management System, are some of the topics of regulatory inspection.

Article 19 (5) Engineering and technical support

General availability of necessary engineering and technical support in all safety related fields for all nuclear installations, under construction, in operation, under accident conditions or under decommissioning

Service providers might be utilized by the operator in all safety related fields for all nuclear installations, under construction, in operation, under accident conditions or under decommissioning. In other side, BAPETEN as the regulator might use their independent TSO for the same purposes. As an example of the uses of service provider, BCR No 2 Year 2011 stated that modification of the installation might be carried out by other party or contractor, yet the responsibility cannot be delegated. In this case, BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on Management System for Facilities and Activities requires the licensee to perform audit to safety related contractor/supplier. In Indonesia, service provider and TSO can be from universities, national research institutes, state own and private companies. For the current situation in the utilization and regulation of nuclear energy, national service providers and TSOs are considered as available.

General availability of necessary technical support on the site and also at the license holder or utility headquarters, and procedures for making central resources available for nuclear installations

All research reactors and the site for experimental power reactor are located in one island, i.e. Java island. This situation makes it easier for the operator and BAPETEN to receive prompt support from their service providers or TSO.

General situation with regard to dependence on consultants and contractors for technical support to nuclear installations

For the existing research reactors and the current site licensing process of the proposed experimental power reactor, both BATAN and BAPETEN have a sufficient competency to discuss all technical problems with their consultants and contractors. Competency building planned by BATAN and BAPETEN might be expected that both sides could be a smart customer of their service providers or TSOs in the future needs of specific expertise both in deterministic and probabilistic safety assessment.

Regulatory review and control activities

Under BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on Management System for Facilities and Activities, BAPETEN performs review and assessment of resources management performed by the licensee. Furthermore, review and assessment of applicant licensing document based on GR No. 2 Year 2014 might reflect the sufficiency of the applicant resources, including the availability of their technical support.

Article 19 (6) Reporting of incidents significant to safety

Regulatory requirements

GR No. 54 Year 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation requires the licensee to report to the Chairman of BAPETEN should there is an anticipated transient, DBA, BDBA or nuclear emergency. The report shall be communicated in oral no later than one hour and in written no later than 2x24 hours after the event is identified. The content of the report and detail procedure of reporting protocol can be found in BCR No. 1 Year 2010 on the Emergency Preparedness and Response.

Reporting criteria and reporting procedures

As general criteria, the licensee has to report anticipated transient, DBA, BDBA or nuclear emergency, through an oral and written procedures.

Statistics of reported incidents significant to safety for the past three years

For the research reactor, there were no significant to safety incidents in the past three years. Complete report of incident has been sent to the IAEA Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors (IRSRR) programme.

Documentation and publication of reported events and incidents by both the license holders and the regulatory body

Documentation of reported events and incidents by both the license holders and the regulatory body shall be subject for implementation under the management system of both sides, including lesson learned from the events. Publication of these reported events in the research reactors is carried out through the IAEA IRSRR programme. In Indonesia, this involves national coordinator and local coordinators of each reactor. IRSRR can be used as a medium for sharing experiences of the incident which occurred in each local research reactors or also of similar research reactors worldwide. Both BATAN and BAPETEN are actively participated in the IAEA-IRSRR forum. For publication purposes, all national institution has to follow Act No. 14 Year 2008 on the Transparency of Public Information. This Act states that government institution has to provide opportunity for public to obtain information related to function, task and activities of the institution.

Policy for use of the INES scale

As one of the policies of regulatory body established in its Strategic Plan document, INES Scale is used as performance indicator of BAPETEN. Hence all of the incidents reported by the licensee will be reviewed and classified in the INES scale.

Regulatory review and control activities

BAPETEN performs review and inspection in the scope of emergency preparedness and response to all of the licensee. The inspection includes witnessing of facility-scale emergency drill and exercise. BAPETEN also organizes national scale emergency exercise every four years, and engages in international exercise through the IAEA ConvEx programme.

Figure 19. IRSRR Meeting in 2015

Article 19 (7) Operational experience feedback

Regulatory requirements

BCR No. 2 Year 2015 on the Verification and Safety Assessment of Non Power Reactor requires the licensee to submit the review of feedback experiences, which are: identification of operational experiences and important to safety information from other nuclear installation experiences including the result of research. The feedback is an integrated part of periodic safety review document. Managing operational experience feedback is also a function of Management System that has to be implemented by the licensee and regulator.

Overview of programmes of license holders for the operating experience feedback

It's been reported that operation experience feedback, especially from participation to the IAEA IRSRR programme, is positive and very important for the licensee in order to perform a better maintenance and ageing management, improving procedures and staff competency. The licensee programme for this issue is also in accordance to BCR No. 4 Year 2010 on Management System for Facilities and Activities.

Procedures to analyze domestic and international events

The operator staff together with safety division staff of each research reactor in Indonesia is required to periodically assess any domestic and international events related to safety. BATAN operates a center of safety assessment, and its senior staff is usually act as safety committee member. The center and the committee also have an obligation to analyze these safety related domestic and international events. Classification and analysis based on risk/safety assessment and INES scale might be used where applicable.

Procedures to draw conclusions and to implement any necessary actions

Conclusion and the proposed action plan, including modification to the installation and to personnel training programmes and simulators (where applicable), is a subject of review by senior operator and safety committee before it can be established by the licensee. In this case, the licensee has to consider and implement recommendation or suggestion made by the regulatory body.

Mechanisms to share important experience with other operating organizations

Sharing important experience with other operating organizations can be done through the IAEA IRSRR mechanism or through bilateral cooperation where applicable.

Use of international information databases on operating experience

The use of international information databases on operating experience is also carried out through the IAEA IRSRR mechanism.

Regulatory review and control activities for license holder programmes and procedures

BAPETEN performs review and audit in the scope of emergency preparedness and response to all of the licensee, including how they manage operational experience feedback from all resources, both domestic and international. This is also part of licensing issues.

Regulatory body programmes for feedback of operational experience and the use of existing mechanisms to share important experience with international organizations and with other regulatory bodies.

Under the BMS, BAPETEN organize activities related to feedback of operational experience and the use of existing mechanisms to share important experience with international organizations and with other regulatory bodies. BAPETEN also actively participated in the IAEA Asia Nuclear safety Network (ANSN), IRSRR, and other related international missions through TC and other Projects.

Article 19 (8) Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste on the site

Regulatory requirements

Requirements for the on-site handling of spent fuel and radioactive waste are regulated in:

1. GR No. 61 Year 2013 on the Radioactive Waste Management;
2. BCR No. 2 Year 2014 on the Core Management and Handling & Storage of Nuclear Fuel of Non Power Reactor; and
3. BCR No. 3 Year 2010 on System Design for Handling and Storage of Nuclear Power Plant Fuel;

On-site storage of spent fuel

In each of the research reactor in Indonesia there is an interim storage for spent fuel. Indonesia has the Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility, which serves as a temporary storage and transit prior to re-export spent fuel to the country of origin.



Figure 20. Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility

Implementation of on-site treatment, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste;

GR No. 61 Year 2013 on Radioactive Waste Management stated that radioactive waste (also can be generated from reactor) shall be collected, sorted and delivered to the Centre of Radioactive Waste Management, BATAN located in Serpong area. Moreover, the licensee shall store reactor spent fuel temporarily in its site for the lifetime of the reactor operation.

Figure 21. Waste Sorting Process in BATAN

Established procedures for clearance of radioactive waste

BAPETEN has issued regulations related to clearance restrictions such as BCR No. 16/2012 on the Clearance Level, GR No. 2 Year 2014, GR No. 61 Year 2013, and GR No. 33 Year 2007. BAPETEN monitors on-site handling of spent fuel and radioactive waste through inspection and review/evaluation of the operation of reports submitted periodically.

Regulatory review and control activities

Beside performing review and inspection in this scope, BAPETEN has developed SALT (Integrated Waste Accounting System), an online application system of waste accounting for all waste producers to report online. BAPETEN conducts inspections on the management of spent fuel and spent fuel storage installations.



Figure 22. The view of SALT programme

Annexes

Table A.1. Data of Nuclear Installation

	Name of Research reactor	Status installation	Nominal licensed	License Validity
1	MPR GA Siwabessy	Operation	30 MW	December 2020
2.	TRIGA 2000 Reactor	Operation	2 MW	December 2016
3.	Kartini Reactor	Operation	100 kW	December 2019

Table A.2. List of Regulation for Nuclear Installation

No.	Title
1	Nuclear Energy Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy
2	GR No. 33 Year 2007 on the Ionizing Radiation Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
3	GR No. 29 Year 2008 on the Licensing of Ionizing Radiation Sources and Nuclear Material
4	GR No. 46 Year 2009 on the Limit of Nuclear Damage Liability
5	GR No. 54 Year 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation
6	GR No. 2 Year 2014 on the Licensing of Nuclear Reactor and Utilization of nuclear materials
7	GR No. 61 Year 2013 on the Radioactive Waste Management
8	GR No. 58 Year 2015 on the Safety of Radioactive Material Transportation
9	Presidential Decree No. 82 Year 1993 on the Ratification of Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiology Emergency
10	Presidential Decree No. 81 Year 1993 on the Ratification of Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
11	Presidential Decree No. 106 Year 2001 on the Ratification of Convention on Nuclear Safety
12	Presidential Regulation No. 46 Year 2006 on the Ratification of Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
13	Presidential Regulation No. 74 Year 2012 on the Nuclear Liability
14	BAPETEN Chairman Regulation (BCR) No. 3 Year 2011 on Safety Design of Nuclear Power Reactor
15	BCR No. 7 Year 2011 on Safety Design of Emergency Power Supply for Nuclear Power Reactor
16	BCR No. 1 Year 2012 on the Design of Protection against Fire and Explosive Hazards for Nuclear Power Reactor
17	BCR No. 2 Year 2012 on the Design of Protection against Internal Hazards other than Fire and Explosive Hazards for Nuclear Power Reactor

No.	Title
18	BCR No. 6 Year 2012 on the Design of Computer Based Important to Safety System for Nuclear Power Reactor
19	BCR No. 8 Year 2012 on the Format and Content of Developing Safety Analysis Report of Non Power Reactor
20	BCR No. 4 Year 2013 on Protection and Radiation Safety for Utilizing Nuclear Energy
21	BCR No. 6 Year 2013 on Working Permit for Personnel in Installation and Nuclear Material
22	BCR No. 7 Year 2013 on the Environmental Radioactivity Limit
23	BCR No. 9 Year 2013 on Operational Limit and Condition for Non Power Reactor
24	BCR No. 2 Year 2014 on Core Management and Fuel Handling and Storage for Nuclear Power Reactor
25	BCR No. 3 Year 2014 on the Format and Content of Environmental Impact Analysis of Nuclear Energy Utilization
26	BCR No. 6 Year 2014 on the Site Evaluation in the Meteorology and Hydrology Aspect of Nuclear Installation
27.	BCR No. 2 Year 2015 on the Assessment and Verification of Safety for Non Power Reactor
28.	BCR No. 5 Year 2015 on the Site Evaluation in the Volcanology Aspect of Nuclear Installation